

SUPPORTING INFORMATION, SECTION A

Examples of Salient Liberal Supreme Court Decisions in the Contemporary Era

Thinking about some of the landmark cases that emerged from the Rehnquist Court of the 1990s and 2000s, the liberal trends in Figure 1b should not come as a huge surprise. The Court has issued liberal decisions on cases of significant legal importance that have served as lightning rods for broader political debates and have drawn the ire of conservative leaders. Examples include the University of Michigan affirmative action decision upholding the use of race as a factor in admissions,¹ the Texas sodomy case,² the enemy combatant cases,³ the upholding of the landmark *Miranda* ruling,⁴ the invalidation of the death penalty for juveniles⁵ and those with mental retardation,⁶ the invalidation of school prayer at high school football games,⁷ and the Court's invalidation of state laws banning partial-birth abortion.⁸ Adding fuel to the fire for many conservatives in the mass public is the Court's consistent failure to overturn *Roe v. Wade* (1973). *Planned Parenthood v. Casey* (1992) significantly altered *Roe* by allowing states more latitude in passing abortion restrictions, but it upheld the *Roe*'s core of a woman's constitutional right to have an abortion. Of course, the cases just mentioned provide examples high-profile liberal decisions only. The Court has also issued its fair share of conservative decisions, including *Bush v. Gore* (2000), which ended the 2000 presidential election and effectively ensured victory for George W. Bush. The point in highlighting these cases is that one would not necessarily expect a "conservative" Court to issue as many significant liberal decisions as it has.

¹ The decision in *Gratz v. Bollinger* (2003) ruled the University of Michigan's use of a points system at the undergraduate level unconstitutional. However, in *Grutter v. Bollinger* (2003), the Court, in an affirmation of the landmark *Regents v. Bakke* (1978) case, upheld the Michigan Law School's use of race as one of many considerations in the application process.

² In *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003), the Court struck down a Texas law that made homosexual sodomy illegal.

³ In 2004, the Court issued three significant rulings concerning enemy combatants related to the war on terror. In *Rasul v. Bush* (2004), the Court ruled that detainees at Guantanamo Bay should be given habeas corpus rights. In *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld* (2004), the Court ruled that Hamdi, an American citizen and detainee, had the right to challenge his enemy combatant status and that federal courts are not required to defer to the Executive Branch's determinations of what constitutes an enemy combatant. In the third case, *Rumsfeld v. Padilla* (2004), the Court did not issue a substantive ruling on whether the President was authorized to detain a U.S. citizen determined to be an enemy combatant, and ruled instead that Padilla filed his habeas petition in the wrong jurisdiction.

⁴ In *United States v. Dickerson* (2000), the Court upheld the landmark *Miranda* ruling, which prescribed that police must make criminal suspects aware of their constitutional rights prior to arrest.

⁵ *Roper v. Simmons* (2005).

⁶ *Atkins v. Virginia* (2002).

⁷ In *Sante Fe Independent School District v. Doe* (2000), the Court ruled that student-led prayer at football games was unconstitutional (in violation of the Establishment Clause).

⁸ *Stenberg v. Carhart* (2000) ruled a Nebraska partial-birth abortion ban as unconstitutional because it did not contain a provision for the health of the mother. However, the 2007 decision, *Gonzales v. Carhart*, upheld the partial-birth abortion ban at the federal level.

SUPPORTING INFORMATION, SECTION B
Question Wording from 2005 Annenberg Supreme Court Survey

Note: Numbers in parentheses represent the percentage of respondents giving the particular response.

Supreme Court Legitimacy

1. Thinking about the current Supreme Court, please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following—If the Supreme Court started making a lot of rulings that most Americans disagreed with, it might be better to do away with the Court altogether. Strongly agree (10.2), somewhat agree (10.8), somewhat disagree (21.4), strongly disagree (57.63).
2. Thinking about the current Supreme Court, please tell me if you strongly agree (36.5), somewhat agree (35.9), somewhat disagree (17.8) or strongly disagree (9.8) with the following statement—The Supreme Court gets too mixed up in politics.
3. Thinking about the current Supreme Court, please tell me if you strongly agree (34.1), somewhat agree (39.9), somewhat disagree (17.0) or strongly disagree (9.0) with the following statement—The decisions of the Supreme Court favor some groups more than others.
4. Thinking about the current Supreme Court, please tell me if you strongly agree (22.3), somewhat agree (55.4), somewhat disagree (14.1) or strongly disagree (8.3) with the following statement—The Supreme Court can usually be trusted to make decisions that are right for the country as a whole.
5. Generally speaking, how much do you trust the Supreme Court to operate in the best interests of the American people—a great deal (21.6), a fair amount (55.7), not too much (16.1) or not at all (6.6)?

Items for Subjective Ideological Disagreement (see text for measurement details)

1. **Ideology:** In politics today, would you describe your views as very liberal (4.0), liberal (23.9), moderate (34.2), conservative (28.1), or very conservative (9.8)?
2. **Perception of Ideological Tenor of the Court:** “Judging by its recent decisions, do you think the Supreme Court is generally liberal (20.5), generally conservative (26.1), or is it making decisions more on a case-by-case basis (53.4)?”

Party Identification: In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican (33.4), Democrat (33.9) or Independent (32.7)?

Political Trust: Generally speaking, how much do you trust the federal government as a whole to operate in the best interests of the American people—a great deal (12.1), a fair amount (50.1), not too much (26.9) or not at all (10.9)?

Awareness of Supreme Court (numbers for items 1-4 represent percentage correct)

1. Do you happen to know who the current Supreme Court Chief Justice is? (27.9)
2. There are currently two Supreme Court Justices who are women. Do you know the names of either or both of these Justices? (36.0)
3. Can the US Supreme Court declare an act of Congress unconstitutional or not? (57.3)
4. If the Supreme Court rules on a decision 5 to 4, does this mean the decision is final, the

decision is too close and needs to be sent to Congress, or the decision is too close and needs to be sent back to the lower courts? (51.7)

5. How well do you feel that you understand the Supreme Court's rulings—very well (7.0), somewhat well (51.8), somewhat poorly (30.0) or very poorly (9.6)?
6. And to what extent do you follow the decisions of the US Supreme Court—a great extent (9.1), a moderate extent (35.2), some extent (42.2), or not at all (12.2)?

Differential Media Exposure (see text for measurement details):

1. Now I would like to ask about where you got your news during the past week. Please tell me how many days in the past week, if any, did you read a daily newspaper?
2. Please tell me how many days in the past week, if any, did you watch national network news on TV—by which I mean Peter Jennings on ABC, Bob Schieffer on CBS, Brian Williams on NBC, or Jim Lehrer on PBS?
3. How often, if at all, do you listen to radio shows that invite listeners to call in to discuss current events, public issues, or politics—almost every day, every week, twice a month, once a month, or never?
4. Now I would like to ask about where you got your news during the past week. Please tell me how many days in the past week, if any, did you watch cable news, such as CNN, Fox News Channel, or MSNBC?

Age: Respondents were asked how old they were. The mean age 50. When recoded from 0 to 1, the mean age is 0.41.

Race: The survey asked respondent's race or ethnicity. Black (9.6), Hispanic (5.2), White or Asian (85.2).

Sex: Female: 51.9%; Male: 48.1%.

Education: What is the highest degree you completed in school? High school degree or less (36.6), some college (25.1), college graduate (19.0), graduate course work (8.8), graduate degree (10.6).

SUPPORTING INFORMATION, SECTION C

Addressing the Potential Concern of Endogeneity

Here, we consider the potential issue of endogeneity induced by reverse causation, i.e., that legitimacy orientations may influence subjective ideological disagreement. Since addressing the issue with an instrumental variables analysis is largely unfeasible, due to the difficulty of finding a valid instrument that explains ideological disagreement but can be assumed to be independent of legitimacy orientations, we turn to alternative means of addressing the issue. One's own ideological identification—which is one component of subjective ideological disagreement—is clearly exogenous to legitimacy. The real issue is whether perceptions of the Court's ideological tenor are influenced by pre-existing stores of legitimacy in interaction with one's own ideology, that is, whether there are projection effects occurring. We take three distinct approaches to dealing with this issue. First, our most powerful evidence suggesting that our causal sequence is valid comes from the survey experiment discussed in the main text of the paper; information on the vignettes is included below. Second, we examined the association between disagreement and legitimacy among a group of legal elites whose subjective perceptions of the Court's decision making should not be subject to reverse causality. Third, we reestimated our key model from the main text using only the “do away with the Court” legitimacy item, which is more strictly normative and thus less entangled with perceptions compared to, say, the legitimacy item asking about the Court being too “mixed up in politics.” We discuss the second and third points below, followed by additional details on the survey experiment design and results.

1. Analysis of “Legal Elites”

The Annenberg Public Policy Center also conducted a survey—the lawyer component—designed to be representative of lawyers admitted to practice in front of the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals. These “legal elites” represent the highest echelons of Court awareness. If we believe that the use of “projection” (i.e., using legitimacy judgments as a heuristic for judgments of the ideological direction of Court decision making) is a means to obtain low-information rationality, then individuals with extensive knowledge of the Court should be less likely to use this strategy for the simple reason that they possess the information for which the heuristic serves as a substitute. This is not to say that all such legal elites will agree on the ideological direction of the Court (for example, such judgments may rely on

subjective importance weights attached to different decisions), but merely that such judgments are based on actual information about Court decisions. 859 lawyers were interviewed between March 18 and May 16, 2005.⁹ Supreme Court legitimacy is measured using the same items as for the mass public sample, except that it does not include the “do away with the Court item,” which was not asked in the lawyer component. The following items were also not included in this survey: party identification, awareness (which we presume would not vary greatly across legal elites), differential media exposure, and education (education varies little across these individuals). Model results for legal elites, shown in Table C1, largely resemble our results reported in Table 3: Subjective ideological disagreement significantly and substantially depresses legitimacy orientations.

Table C1: OLS Model Results for Legal Elites

	Coeff.	(SE)	p	\hat{y}
<i>Subjective Ideological Disagreement</i>				
Strong Disagreement	-0.134	(0.017)	0.000	0.550
Moderate Disagreement	-0.047	(0.017)	0.007	0.638
Tacit Agreement	-0.001	(0.018)	0.974	0.684
Strong Agreement (Baseline Category)	--	--	--	0.685
Political Trust	0.160	(0.029)	0.000	
Age	0.106	(0.044)	0.016	
Hispanic	0.069	(0.043)	0.111	
Black	-0.009	(0.051)	0.855	
Intercept	0.556	(0.026)	0.000	

OLS Estimates; N=819; F=17.42, p<.001; Adj. R²=0.12

The core substantive and statistical inferences for the legal elites analysis are very similar to what we see in analysis of the mass public in Table 3 in the paper. Subjective ideological disagreement exhibits a statistically significant and substantial impact on legitimacy

⁹ The study identified eligible lawyers from the *Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory* via Lexis. 560 lawyers completed an online survey. 299 lawyers who did not respond to the online survey request completed the survey by telephone. The response rate for the lawyer study was 48%, and the cooperation rate was 71%. Rates were calculated in accord with the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) standards. Telephone interviews were conducted by Princeton Data Source, LLC. Online surveys were conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International. Data can be obtained from: www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org. Past research has found some mode differences between internet and telephone samples. Fricker et al. (2005) find that internet users tend to be more educated and younger than telephone samples, and are more likely to give undifferentiated, “straight-line” responses. Chang and Krosnick (2008) find that telephone samples have more random measurement error, more social desirability bias, and higher rates of satisficing. We see no reason to believe that these differences are a valid alternative explanation for our substantive conclusions regarding elite/mass differences.

orientations among legal elites, *ceteris paribus*. A joint F-test shows that the three subjective ideological disagreement coefficients are jointly statistically significant ($F=26.64$, $df=3$, $p<.001$). We believe these results soothe concerns about endogeneity for the reasons above. Strong ideological disagreement significantly and sizably decreases legitimacy orientations, relative to those in ideological agreement. Moderate ideological disagreement also induces significantly lower levels of Supreme Court legitimacy relative to those with strong ideological agreement. Individuals with moderate ideological disagreement have significantly lower legitimacy levels than those who are in tacit agreement ($p<.05$), which again suggests the appropriateness of using the four-category measure relative to the simple three-category distance measure. The minimal and statistically insignificant difference between the tacit and strong agreement groups suggests that liberals and conservatives who assess the Court as issuing rulings on a case-by-case basis are treating that perception as akin to essentially ideological agreement.

2. Analysis of the “Do Away With the Court” Legitimacy Item

We consider a final analysis intended to soothe concerns with endogeneity and to address the argument that some of the items used to operationalize legitimacy are too intertwined with perceptions (e.g., “mixed up in politics”). We thus turn to a model which estimated the regression in Table 3 (in the article) using only the “do away with the Court” item (from the legitimacy scale) as the dependent variable. Our logic for this analysis is that the assumption of exogeneity when using this item as a dependent variable should be less controversial since the item represents a normative prescription regarding the institution itself as opposed to a perception of the Court’s entanglement with ideology and politics. Results from this model are presented in Table C2. The substantive and statistical inferences are extremely similar to our main model results reported in Table 3. Strong and moderate disagreement significantly decrease legitimacy when measured with this single item, or in other words, significantly increase the probability that a respondent wishes to “do away with the Court” when it makes unpopular decisions.

Table C2: Ordered Probit Results Estimating the Model From Table 3 (in the Article) Using Only the “Do Away With the Court” Item as the Dependent Variable

Variable	Coeff.	(SE)	p
<i>Subjective Ideological Disagreement</i>			
Strong Disagreement	-0.248	(0.095)	0.009
Moderate Disagreement	-0.248	(0.117)	0.033
Tacit Agreement	-0.130	(0.091)	0.154
Strong Agreement (Baseline Category)	--	--	--
Republican	0.051	(0.088)	0.565
Independent	0.127	(0.087)	0.143
Political Trust	0.335	(0.129)	0.009
Awareness of the Court	1.628	(0.177)	0.000
Differential Media Exposure	-0.521	(0.187)	0.005
Age	-0.220	(0.167)	0.189
Hispanic	0.039	(0.153)	0.800
Black	-0.262	(0.116)	0.023
Female	-0.125	(0.071)	0.079
Education	0.306	(0.117)	0.009
Ordered Probit Estimates; N=1214; $\chi^2=175.16$, $p<.001$; Pseudo $R^2=0.06$			

3. Additional Information on Survey Experiment

The survey experiment discussed in the article was a 2 [ideological direction of the decision] x 5 [nature of the Court’s decision making process] full-factorial, between-subjects design. For purposes of our article, we are concerned with the first factor only, which manipulated the ideological direction of the Court’s decision. In the conservative decision condition, respondents received the following stimulus:

Washington, D.C., June 25 – The Supreme Court ruled today that federal law enforcement agents do not have the authority to monitor citizens’ communications, including e-mail messages and phone conversations, in investigations of terrorism and related crimes.

Conservative decision condition:

Washington, D.C., June 25 – The Supreme Court ruled today that federal law enforcement agents have the authority to monitor citizens’ communications, including e-mail messages and phone conversations, in investigations of terrorism and related crimes.

In addition to this experimental factor, we manipulated the process by which the Court rendered its decision. The five experimental conditions include: (1) a control group, which received no information about the process; (2) countermajoritarian, overt policymaking portrayal; (3) emphasis on the ideological split among the justices; (4) emphasis on politicization and partisan politics; and (5) emphasis on law-driven decision making.

Individuals, then, were randomly assigned to one of the ten experimental conditions:

1. Decision Outcome: Conservative / Description of Process: Control

Washington, D.C., June 25 – The Supreme Court ruled today that federal law enforcement agents have the authority to monitor citizens’ communications, including e-mail messages and phone conversations, in investigations of terrorism and related crimes.

2. Decision Outcome: Conservative / Description of Process: Policymaking, countermajoritarian

Washington, D.C., June 25 – The Supreme Court ruled today that federal law enforcement agents have the authority to monitor citizens’ communications, including e-mail messages and phone conversations, in investigations of terrorism and related crimes. The decision strikes down a federal law passed by Congress last year that greatly restricted the FBI’s ability to monitor an individual’s communications. Many experts agree that the Court exercised a significant amount of power in overturning a law that received widespread public support and was passed by large majorities in the House and Senate.

3. Decision Outcome: Conservative / Description of Process: Ideological

Washington, D.C., June 25 – The Supreme Court ruled today that federal law enforcement agents have the authority to monitor citizens’ communications, including e-mail messages and phone conversations, in investigations of terrorism and related crimes. The justices split strongly along ideological lines, with conservatives supporting vigorous monitoring measures and liberals opposing them. Many experts agree that instead of following long-standing legal precedents that oppose such strong measures, the justices based their decisions on their personal policy preferences.

4. Decision Outcome: Conservative / Description of Process: Politicized

Washington, D.C., June 25 – The Supreme Court ruled today that federal law enforcement agents have the authority to monitor citizens’ communications, including e-mail messages and phone conversations, in investigations of terrorism and related crimes. The Court’s decision had the appearance of being politicized, given the insertion of partisan politics into the decision. Members of Congress from both parties attempted to influence the justices through written arguments. Many experts agree that these arguments contributed to the stark differences in voting between Republican-appointed justices and Democrat-appointed justices.

5. Decision Outcome: Conservative / Description of Process: Legalistic

Washington, D.C., June 25 – The Supreme Court ruled today that federal law enforcement agents have the authority to monitor citizens’ communications, including e-mail messages and phone conversations, in investigations of terrorism and related crimes. The Court adhered to long-

standing legal precedents that justify strong investigation measures when national security concerns arise. Many experts agree that the justices were strongly guided by prior law, evidenced by the fact that several justices who typically disagree with each other joined together to produce the Court's decision.

6. Decision Outcome: Liberal / Description of Process: Control

Washington, D.C., June 25 – The Supreme Court ruled today that federal law enforcement agents do not have the authority to monitor citizens' communications, including e-mail messages and phone conversations, in investigations of terrorism and related crimes.

7. Decision Outcome: Liberal / Description of Process: Policymaking, countermajoritarian

Washington, D.C., June 25 – The Supreme Court ruled today that federal law enforcement agents do not have the authority to monitor citizens' communications, including e-mail messages and phone conversations, in investigations of terrorism and related crimes. The decision strikes down a federal law passed by Congress last year that greatly expanded the FBI's ability to monitor an individual's communications. Many experts agree that the Court exercised a significant amount of power in overturning a law that received widespread public support and was passed by large majorities in the House and Senate.

8. Decision Outcome: Liberal / Description of Process: Ideological

Washington, D.C., June 25 – The Supreme Court ruled today that federal law enforcement agents do not have the authority to monitor citizens' communications, including e-mail messages and phone conversations, in investigations of terrorism and related crimes. The justices split strongly along ideological lines, with liberals opposing vigorous monitoring measures and conservatives supporting them. Many experts agree that instead of following long-standing legal precedents that justify such strong measures, the justices based their decisions on their personal policy preferences.

9. Decision Outcome: Liberal / Description of Process: Politicized

Washington, D.C., June 25 – The Supreme Court ruled today that federal law enforcement agents do not have the authority to monitor citizens' communications, including e-mail messages and phone conversations, in investigations of terrorism and related crimes. The Court's decision had the appearance of being politicized, given the insertion of partisan politics into the decision. Members of Congress from both parties attempted to influence the justices through written arguments. Many experts agree that these arguments contributed to the stark differences in voting between Democrat-appointed justices and Republican-appointed justices.

10. Decision Outcome: Liberal / Description of Process: Legalistic

Washington, D.C., June 25 – The Supreme Court ruled today that federal law enforcement agents do not have the authority to monitor citizens' communications, including e-mail messages and phone conversations, in investigations of terrorism and related crimes. The Court adhered to long-standing legal precedents that prohibit strong investigation measures even when national security concerns arise. Many experts agree that the justices were strongly guided by prior law, evidenced by the fact that several justices who typically disagree with each other joined together to produce the Court's decision.

Figure 4 in the text and the surrounding discussion highlights the primary substantive findings, but we include the raw OLS regression results (on which Figure 4 is based) below in Table C3. As noted in the text of the article, we reiterate that there was no significant interaction between the two experimental factors. Also, including the “process” factor (dummy variables) in the regression does not alter the underlying results.

Table C3: OLS Regression Results from Survey Experiment

Variable	Coef.	SE	p
Policy Preference (Support for Federal Monitoring)	.09	.03	.00
Treatment (Lib. Dec.=1, Cons. Dec.=0)	.15	.03	.00
Policy Preference x Treatment	-.22	.04	.00
Age	.07	.03	.01
Female	-.02	.01	.05
Black	.00	.02	.83
Hispanic	-.04	.02	.04
Education	.13	.02	.00
Constant	.44	.02	.00
N	1046		
R^2	.11		

SUPPORTING INFORMATION, SECTION D

Awareness Interactions Analysis

Much work in political science and public opinion suggests that the dynamics of political preference formation are conditional on citizens' political sophistication such that the effects of political dispositions on specific preferences increase as a function of sophistication. In the present case it is reasonable to expect a similar dynamic. Specifically, politically engaged citizens (proxied here with Court awareness) may have a larger vested interest in the ideological direction of Court decision making, or in other words, they may, as a result of their engagement, care more about the decisions the Court makes. This investment in the decisions of the Court may then increase the influence of ideological disagreement on legitimacy. In contrast, for citizens who lack political engagement, ideological disagreement may be of lower concern.

To examine this possibility we interacted Court awareness with our measure of subjective ideological disagreement and reestimated our key model from Table 3. The results are included in Table D1 below. On the whole, the interactions present a clear story: as awareness increases, the overall impact of subjective ideological disagreement increases substantially. Below, we discuss the graph (Figure D1) illustrating the substantive depiction of the interaction, but first we discuss the results in Table D1. The coefficients for the constituent terms for the subjective ideological disagreement dummies represent conditional effects, relative to strong agreement (the baseline category), when awareness=0 (its minimum value). For instance, when awareness=0, the difference in legitimacy orientations between strong ideological disagreement and strong agreement is $-.028$, which is statistically insignificant.

The important part of the table is the interactions, which show how much these effects change as awareness increases. The statistically significant and substantial awareness x strong disagreement interaction means that as awareness increases, the effect of strong disagreement (relative to strong agreement) is significantly enhanced (becomes more negative). The same is true for the awareness x moderate disagreement interaction. The awareness x tacit agreement interaction is not statistically significant, meaning that awareness does not significantly increase the gulf in legitimacy orientations between the tacit and strong agreement groups. Figure D1 illustrates the interaction effect, showing that as awareness increases, the overall impact of subjective ideological disagreement on legitimacy orientations increases quite substantially.

One potential objection to this analysis again concerns the possibility that the results are

driven by reverse causality. More specifically, recent evidence suggests that politically engaged citizens are actually more likely to engage in various forms of motivated reasoning (e.g. Taber and Lodge 2006), and thus they may be more likely to project their feelings about the Court onto their perceptions of the Court's ideology. We again cannot entirely rule out this possibility with cross-sectional data. Of course, we have already produced experimental evidence suggesting causal validity associated with our general results. Nonetheless, there is good reason to expect, in this case at least, that the theory and hypotheses we have presented possess suitable internal validity.


Related to the analysis for legal elites (in Supporting Information, Section C), politically knowledgeable citizens should have more information regarding the Court's outputs than less knowledgeable citizens, and so it could be argued that they should be less reliant on projection in this context. In addition, the expectation of greater motivated reasoning among the politically engaged relies, to a large extent at least, on the fact that such citizens are more personally invested in politics (and thus are more motivated to see the world through a partisan lens; e.g. seeing the economy as doing well under a favored President). This association of knowledge to personal investment, however, suggests a second, and we think more plausible, reason for the interaction with knowledge: knowledgeable citizens, because of their greater investment in their political orientations, are more affected by perceived disagreement with the Court. In other words, the effect of disagreement is stronger among knowledgeable citizens because they care more about such outcomes.

Table D1: OLS Model Results with Awareness Interactions (Mass Public Sample)

	Coeff.	(SE)	p
<i>Subjective Ideological Disagreement</i>			
Strong Disagreement	-0.028	(0.032)	0.374
Moderate Disagreement	-0.019	(0.041)	0.649
Tacit Agreement	0.022	(0.029)	0.451
Strong Agreement (Baseline Category)	--		
Awareness of the Court	0.342	(0.045)	0.000
Awareness x Strong Disagreement	-0.233	(0.060)	0.000
Awareness x Moderate Disagreement	-0.148	(0.077)	0.054
Awareness x Tacit Agreement	-0.080	(0.056)	0.149
Republican	-0.006	(0.013)	0.612
Independent	-0.004	(0.012)	0.722
Political Trust	0.241	(0.019)	0.000
Differential Media Exposure	-0.088	(0.026)	0.001
Age	-0.031	(0.024)	0.203
Hispanic	-0.003	(0.022)	0.896
Black	-0.057	(0.017)	0.001
Female	-0.022	(0.010)	0.029
Education	0.061	(0.016)	0.000
Intercept	0.361	(0.032)	0.000

OLS Estimates; N=1236; F=36.83, p<.001; Adj. R²=0.32

Figure D1: Graph Illustrating Awareness Interactions



Note: SA=Strong Agreement; TA=Tacit Agreement; MD=Moderate Disagreement; SD=Strong Disagreement. Awareness is set at the 10th, 50th (median), and 90th percentiles for the low, median, and high awareness plots, respectively, in the graph.

SUPPORTING INFORMATION, SECTION E
Full Model Results for Testing Hypothesis 2

Table E1: OLS Model Testing the Impact of Ideology on Supreme Court Legitimacy, Conditional on Perceptions of the Supreme Court’s Ideological Tenor (Hypothesis 2)

Variable	Coeff.	(SE)	p
Ideology	0.215	(0.104)	0.040
Ideology Squared	-0.190	(0.093)	0.041
Perception of Court as Liberal	-0.055	(0.079)	0.484
Perception of Court as Conservative	-0.082	(0.039)	0.035
Ideology x Perception of Court as Liberal	-0.134	(0.250)	0.591
Ideology Squared x Perception of Court as Liberal	-0.008	(0.193)	0.968
Ideology x Perception of Court as Conservative	-0.031	(0.165)	0.850
Ideology Squared x Perception of Court as Conservative	0.131	(0.161)	0.414
Republican	0.014	(0.014)	0.321
Independent	-0.001	(0.012)	0.951
Political Trust	0.244	(0.018)	0.000
Awareness of the Court	0.221	(0.024)	0.000
Differential Media Exposure	-0.072	(0.026)	0.006
Age	-0.027	(0.024)	0.262
Hispanic	-0.013	(0.022)	0.558
Black	-0.064	(0.017)	0.000
Female	-0.027	(0.010)	0.008
Education	0.061	(0.016)	0.000
Intercept	0.347	(0.036)	0.000

OLS Estimates; N=1236; F=34.75 (df=18), p<.001; Adj. R^2 =0.33

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